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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
on this subject upholds jurisdiction. s22 And the result of interpreting the
statute in this manner is manifestly desirable.123
PERSONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Three recent Second Circuit cases have illuminated the shadowy
contours of federal jurisdiction under Title 28, section 1343(3) of the
United States Code which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, priv-
ilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.124
All three cases have relied on Justice Stone's formulation that the Civil
Rights' statutes confer jurisdiction only when "the right or immunity
is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the in-
fringement of property rights."' 25 All three cases concern rights secured
by the Constitution and not rights secured by federal laws. This dis-
This objective was approved in Rosado v. Wyman, 897 U.S. 397 (1970):
We are not willing to defeat the common sense policy of pendent jurisdiction-
the conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litiga-
tion-by a conceptual approach that would require jurisdiction over the pri-
mary claim at all stages as a prerequisite to the resolution of the pendent claim.
397 U.S. at 405.
12228 U.S.C. § 1388(b) (1964) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting
a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim
under the copyright, patent or trademark laws.
Except for section 1338(b) pendent jurisdiction has been a judicial doctrine. The
American Law Institute included statutory treatment of pendent jurisdiction in its sug-
gested revision of title 28. AU, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTrON BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL CouRTs § 1313(a) (Tent. Draft No. 5, May 2, 1967):
ahe court shall have jurisdiction to determine all claims arising under State
law that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transac-
actions or occurrences as the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim, if such a
determination is necessarily in order to give effective relief on the federal claim
or counterclaim or if a substantial question of fact is common to the claims
arising under State law and to the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim.
123 With the state courts complaining about their small budgets and large case
loads, it would not be unreasonable for the federal courts to assume their obligation
to absorb their share of the cases. Moreover, the objective of a "just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action" will be better served if an entire dispute can be
resolved by one court.
124 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). This section has no jurisdictional amount requirement,
unlike the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), which requires that
the amount in controversy exceed the sum or value of $10,000.
125 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring). Justice Stone's
formulation is criticized in Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HAv. L.
REv. 1285, 1288-91 (1953).
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tinction is relevant since it avoids the problem of the disparity in lan-
guage between section 1343(3) which confers judisdiction and section
1983 which creates a federal cause of action.126 The latter grants a cause
of action for "deprivation of rights secured by federal laws"'21 7 while
the former limits jurisdiction to "rights secured by any act of Congress
providing for equal rights.' 2 8
The first case, Johnson v. Harder,129 concerned a mother who
claimed that a reduction in her welfare benefits was a denial of due
process and the equal protection of the laws. Here the court faced the
problem of applying Justice Stone's formulation to a concrete fact sit-
uation. While welfare payments are money benefits and, as such, com-
prise only a property right, their denial deprives an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live. 30 Aware of this dual nature of welfare
payments, the court held:
Since welfare cases by their very nature involve people at a bare
subsistence level, disputes over the correct amounts payable are
treated not merely as involving property rights, but some sort of
right to exist in society, a personal right under the Stone formula.131
In Johnson, the court distinguished its earlier ruling in Mc Call v. Sha-
piro13 2 which had denied federal jurisdiction. In that case, the appellant
raised a due process claim as to the termination of her Aid For Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) benefits at the district court level. On appeal,
she relied solely on the statutory claim that the state regulations con-
flicted with federal provisions. 33 Subsequently, in Johnson, similar
126 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). In cases involving constitutional claims the disparity in
language is not a factor. See Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565 n.8 (2d Cir. 1969).
Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 US. 68 (1900), held that the predecessors of both
section 1343(3) and section 1983 applied only to "civil rights." Section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, is the common source of both sections. But see Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961), where Justice Douglas stated that the ". . . history of the
section of the Civil Rights Act presently invoked [42 U.S.C. section 1983] does not permit
such a narrow interpretation." Cf. Note, Limiting The Section 1983 Action in the Wake
of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HAv. L. Rav. 1486, 1487 (1967).
For an analysis of the legislative history of sections 1343(3) and 1983 see Herzer,
Federal Jurisdiction over Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 Hanv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ.
LIB. L. REv. 1, 4-8 (1970).
12742 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
12828 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
129 438 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1971).
130 Language used in several welfare cases indicates the importance attached to
these benefits by the Supreme Court. Public assistance "involves the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
A state's action "may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live"
or render his situation "immediately desperate." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264
(1970).
131 438 F.2d at 12.
132 416 F,2d 246 (2d Cir. 1969).
133 It appears that the Second Circuit will deny jurisdiction to a welfare claimant
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constitutional claims were preserved and fully raised on appeal. The
court altered its earlier position by stating that if "a colorable constitu-
tional claim has been raised, jurisdiction will properly lie." 34
The most consistent application of the property -personal rights
distinction has been in cases involving taxation where the courts have
been uniform in dismissing these actions for lack of section 1348 juris-
diction.""5 In Eisen v. Eastman 3 a landlord brought an action challeng-
ing a reduction in the maximum rents chargeable under a city rent
control law. The court of appeals held that since the complaint alleged
who bases his action solely on a conflict between a state regulation and the Social Se-
curity Act: "To assume jurisdiction here (of statutory welfare claims) would be to accept
a federal court review power over almost every ruling of the [state] Commissioner in
the day to day operation of state welfare laws, regardless of the amount involved."
Mc Call v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (1969). But see Note, Section 1983: A Civil Remedy
for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 839 (1964) which argues that the
legislative purpose of sections 1983 and 1343(3) was to alter the balance of power between
federal and state authorities so that federal courts could more effectively protect federal
rights. There are strong policy considerations which support federal jurisdiction over
non-constitutional welfare claims. Both federal and state administrative forums are in-
adequate to decide claims based upon a conflict between state and federal provisions.
On the federal level, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) has been
reticent to apply its own sanction - a complete termination of funds to those states
whose welfare programs operate contrary to federal law. Furthermore, there is no formal
means, no procedure for the filing of complaints or appeals, by which a dissatisfied
individual can bring his claim before the federal agency. Although state fair hearing
procedures exist on the state level, they do not generate a binding body of law delineat-
ing the permissible scope of administrative discretion. In any event, there are inherent
advantages in providing a federal forum to review questions based primarily on con-
formity to federal law. See Herzer, Federal Jurisdiction over Statutorily-Based Welfare
Claims, 6 HARv. Crv. Rlixnrs-Cv. Ian. L. REv. 1, 9-I1 (1970); Note, Federal Judicial Re-
view Of State Welfare Practices, COLUM. L. Ray. 84, 92-94 (1967).
134 438 F.2d at 12. (A colorable constitutional claim together with a statutory claim
will provide a basis for federal jurisdiction and may enable the court to decide the case
on the statutory claim. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction permits such a result.)
In Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), appellees made two principal
claims: one based on a violation of the Social Security Act, the other based on a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause in that the state statute provided for lower payments
to residents of Nassau County than to residents of Queens County. A majority of the
court ruled that federal jurisdiction did not exist but Judge Feinberg, in his dissenting
opinion, would have upheld the court's jurisdiction on the theory of pendent jurisdic-
tion, even though the constitutional claim had become moot. The Supreme Court re-
versed the majority decision of the Second Circuit and stated: "For essentially those
reasons stated in the Opinion of the District Court and Judge Feinberg's dissent, we
think the District Court correctly exercised its discretion by proceeding to the merits."
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 401 (1970). In this welfare case, Judge Feinberg said
that pendent jurisdiction was justified by "the saving of judicial time once the case had
gone as far as it had, by concern for fairness to the litigants, and by -the appropriateness
of having a federal court decide the issue whether congressional conditions to receipt
of federal funds are met." 414 F.2d at 185. See generally United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 US. 238 (1933).
135 See, e.g., Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd per curiam,
393 U.S. 9 (1968); Alterman Transportation Lines v. Public Service Commission, 259
F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 US. 262 (1967).
136421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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only the-loss of money, jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act was not
established. While the decision in Eisen is clear-cut, its dicta that cases
involving discharges from public employment "can be viewed about
equally well as complaining of a deprivation of the personal liberty to
pursue a calling of one's choice or of the profits or emoluments deriving
therefrom, 1 37 may have the effect of opening the floodgates to new liti-
gation seeking federal jurisdiction. However, in two recent cases, Ti-
chon v. Harder1 38 and Canty v. Board of Education,130 the Second
Circuit has stuck its finger in the dike. In both cases, probationary em-
ployees were discharged for unsatisfactory work from positions of public
employment. In both cases, petitioners relied on general notions of
procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment rather than
alleging specific violations of rights protected by the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution. In both cases, federal jurisdiction was denied.
In the Tichon case, the court handed down a seemingly ironclad
rule:
When the underlying interest allegedly injured by the [employ-
ment] discharge is one unprotected by any of the first eight amend-
ments, exclusive of protection of property, it is difficult to charac-
terize the claim as one involving "a right of personal liberty"
because it becomes more apparent that the only interest at stake
is a claimed right to a particular job, an interest easily measured
in monetary terms and uneasily equated with "personal liberty."' 40
The court distinguished this case from the situation existing in Johnson
by saying that,
"Unlike welfare recipients, who exist at a bare subsistence level,
it cannot be said that an employee's rights to the profits from hisjob entail "some sort of right to exist in society.' ' 41
The court retreats somewhat from this strong position when it subse-
quently states that:
"[Iln the absense of a clear, immediate and substantial impact
on the employee's reputation which effectively destroys his ability
to engage in his occupation, it cannot be said that a right of per-
sonal liberty is involved."1 42
137421 F.2d at 565.
138 438 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1971).
139 448 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971).
140438 F.2d at 1400. See, e.g., Slochower v. Bd. of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956)
(exercise of fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination); Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (first amendment interest). 135 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1970); Birnbaum v.
Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 -(2d Cir. 1966).
141438 F.2d at 1400.
142 Id. at 1402.
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The Tichon and Canty cases suggest that, as a general rule, a dis-
charge from employment case will not be given federal jurisdiction
under section 1343(3).143 There are two possible exceptions to this rule:
(1) an employee who has become established in an occupation or pro-
fession and has created a reservoir of standing and reputation for skill,
honesty and trust, and (2) an employee who is dismissed for racial bias
or discrimination, a charge which "permanently brands the person ac-
cused as one who is unable to put public and professional duty above
personal bias." 144
There are two potential obstacles to adjudication of constitutional
claims in the federal courts even if jurisdiction would otherwise exist
under section 1343(3). Under the judicially developed doctrine of ab-
stention, a federal court could refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
in order to allow the state courts to resolve issues of state law which
might render a determination of the constitutional issues unneces-
sary.145 However, it seems unlikely that this doctrine would apply to
welfare cases since the meaning of a welfare regulation is usually clear
on its face and its applicability to a given plaintiff is not likely to be
uncertain. Furthermore, a federal decision would not disrupt a reg-
ulatory scheme in which the state has a substantial interest because the
questions presented are generally federal (relating to social security
regulations) and state statutory regulations are adoptions of the federal
program. Most importantly, a welfare claimant suffers immediate and
irreparable harm when his benefits are cut off. Under such circum-
stances, an untimely delay is uncalled for.146
A second obstacle to federal jurisdiction is the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies.147 This doctrine would attach to both
employment and welfare cases. This doctrine exists whenever a state
143 Cf. Gold v. Lomenzo, 425 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1970) (A real estate broker had his
license revoked for charging excessive fees). The general rule established in the Tichon
and Canty cases is in accord with the dissenting opinion in Gold.
144 Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1966).
145The abstention doctrine has been held appropriate even when the federal suit
is brought under section 1343 to challenge a deprivation of civil rights. Harrison v.
N.A.A.C.P., 360 US. 167 (1959). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas argued that a
suit brought under the Civil Rights Act is never a proper vehicle for the abstention
doctrine. See also, Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction And the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 216, 230 (1948).
140 See generally, Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM.
L. REv. 84, 97-101 (1967).
147 See McNeese v. Bd. of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963). It has been argued that
McNeese abolished the requirement of exhaustion of adequate state administrative reme-
dies in all cases brought under Section 1983. Note, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under
the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1201, 1203 n.15 (1968). But see Eisen v. Eastman,
421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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has provided for a speedy appeal to a higher administrative officer. Ex-
haustion of state administrative remedies is not required when the
remedy is inadequate or either certainly or probably futile.148
148 A case is currently before the Supreme Court to determine whether the exhaus-
tion of state administrative remedies is a prerequisite to a high school teacher's filing
of a Civil Rights suit challenging his dismissal for refusing to shave his beard. Ball v.
Kerrville School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3056 (U.S.
May 24, 1971) (No. 70-199).
